same day the representatives declared themselves to be in permanent session and that any attempt to dissolve them would be an act of high treason.7
At this point Davout seemed to realize that the Empire could not survive and that any attempt to prolong it would lead to civil war. "The moment to act had passed."8 He therefore made it known that he would not support the use of force against the elected representatives of the people. "The resolution of the representatives," he readily admitted, "was illegal and unconstitutional; but it was a completed act against which there now remained only the use of brutal force."9 Napoleon, after unsuccessfully attempting to secure the backing of the Chamber of Representatives, abdicated in favor of his son, the king of Rome.l0
The two chambers nominally accepted the four-year-old Napoleon II, who was with his mother in Vienna, as his father's successor and then appointed a five-man Commission of Government" to act as an executive in the child's absence. Although Carnot had received the greatest number of votes in the balloting, Fouche outmaneuvered him and became president of the commission. The former minister of police wished to be the principal tool by which the king was restored to his throne, and by thus ingratiating himself to the court, secure a position in the new cabinet of ministers. He had not been caught unprepared by Waterloo. Indeed, he had not believed that Napoleon could consolidate his position on the battlefield.12 He had been in contact with Talleyrand at Vienna, the British government in London, and the exiled Bourbon court at Ghent. He had also released the royalist agent Baron Eugene de Vitrolles,13 whom Napoleon had confined in the Abbaye.
Vitrolles immediately established himself as the king's representative in Paris, although in fact he had no authority to speak for Louis XVIII, who believed him to be still in prison. Nevertheless, his In fact, Oudinot continued, the king was asking the minister of war if there was not a proposition he wished to make to him. Davout was given to believe that this invitation came by way of Vitrolles, who had full authority to speak for Louis XVIII.17 Davout at once sat down and penned a letter stating the conditions under which he, and he believed the army and government also, would accept the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty. "The King must enter Paris," he wrote, "without the aid of foreign troops, who must not approach within thirty leagues of the capital; the two chambers and the army must be conserved until an armistice is concluded; a total disregard of all discussions, votes, and legislative acts relative to the events of the past week; and an assurance of the security of Napoleon and his family."18 This is the first indication that Davout would accept the restoration of the king. Undoubtedly Oudinot exercised some influence over the decision, which reflected an acceptance of reality rather than proroyalist sympathies. Davout had no intention of playing Fouche's game. He was not interested in personal gains'9 but in salvaging the best possible settlement for France and the army, both of which he saw to be in the greatest danger. His relationship with the government 14 . Before leaving La Villette he signed a sheet of paper which was designated as the one to have the address written on it in the terms upon which they had agreed. A general, who had libeled him in Belgium, now abused his confidence, which gives some idea of the lack of scruples when political passions are aroused. He substituted for the first part of the address an entirely new statement, drafted by himself, which was nothing more than a violent diatribe against the Bourbons-a declaration that the army would never consent to submit to their yoke. It was useless to insist on using such inappropriate language on the part of the army when it was perfectly evident that, sooner or later, the return of the King would be the inevitable result of this crisis" (p. 733). Early on the morning of July 3 the Prussian army, now in strength in the Issy-Vanves section of the line on the left bank, prepared to continue its harassment of the capital. Davout had shifted all but a few units of his army to meet this threat and, in fact, having a superiority of men and guns at the point of contact, was himself preparing to attack the enemy. This was the battle he had tried to avoid; but failing to obtain an armistice and given the aggressiveness of Bliicher, he now believed that he had no alternative but to fight. The two armies were already engaged in preliminary actions when the Baron Louis Bignon, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, arrived at army headquarters, which had been moved to Montrouge on the left bank of the Seine. Bignon announced that he had been sent by the government with full powers to negotiate the capitulation of Paris. With mixed emotions Davout ordered a halt to his preparations and secured a ceasefire so that the talks could begin. He was relieved that a useless slaughter-one which would have had no effect on the outcome of the campaign-had been avoided; but he also knew that the army strongly desired one last battle, and that, deprived of it, the stability which had been attained since Waterloo would be destroyed.
By the terms of the capitulation the French army evacuated the city of Paris and its fortifications and withdrew to the south bank of the Loire. With the army deprived of the opportunity to avenge the humiliating defeat at Waterloo, morale and discipline sank to a new low. Thousands of men deserted during the dark days that followed. "I have 81 deserters from the 33rd, and 87 from the 86th," wrote General Pierre Berthezene, "in my artillery the desertion is so high sioners, "that you will be content with the King, and that he will probably grant more than you demand."55 When they informed the minister that their instructions required guarantees, Saint-Cyr arranged for their demands to be put before the king and his council of ministers. On July 11 they received a negative reply. The new government absolutely refused to enter into any form of discussion with the representatives of the army until after they had submitted to the authority of the king. Davout had labored tirelessly to achieve the political and military settlement which would most benefit the nation and the army. From the battle of Waterloo until he was relieved of command of the Army of the Loire, Davout did all that was within his power to save France from the wrath of the victorious Allies and the army from the vengeance of the returning royalists. He had prevented the horrors that would have accompanied a siege of Paris. He had assured the peaceful restoration of Louis XVIII by preventing the army from championing the Bonapartist cause; and he had rallied the demoralized army and kept at least the majority of its troops in their ranks. He had failed, although not without a supreme effort, to prevent the proscription of the officer corps and the eventual disintegration of the army. His recompense was the disdain of the restored royalist government, which sent him into temporary exile, and harsh criticism from the Bonapartists for allegedly having deserted the emperor in his time of need.
